Conflict and Surprise: Heuristics for Model Revision by Laskey, Kathryn Blackmond
Conflict and Surprise: 
Heuristics for Model Revision 
Kathryn Blackmond Laskey 
Department of Systems Engineering and c3r Center 
George Mason University 
Fairfax, VA 22030 
Abstract 
Any probabilistic model of a problem is based 
on assumptions which, if violated, invalidate 
the model. Users of probability based decision 
aids need to be alerted when cases arise that are 
not covered by the aid's model. Diagnosis of 
model failure is also necessary to control 
dynamic model construction and revision. 
This paper presents a set of decision 
theoretically motivated heuristics for 
diagnosing situations in which a model is 
likely to provide an inadequate representation 
of the process being modeled. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Building a model for an inference problem involves 
constructing and reasoning within a restricted universe 
of propositions relevant to the inference problem at 
hand. Following Savage (1954), I term this restricted 
universe a small world (actually, a small set of 
possible worlds). The small world must obviously 
include those propositions of direct inferential interest. 
It also includes certain other propositions which bear on 
the propositions of interest and about which 
information may be available, either directly or 
indirectly. A model for the inference problem specifies 
relationships (logical or probabilistic) between 
propositions in the small world, and inference rules for 
revising beliefs as information is obtained. 
The small world includes those propositions represented 
explicitly in the inference system. But a model of the 
relationships between these propositions often depends 
on a background context that is not explicitly 
represented. The model may make inferences that are 
seriously in error if these background assumptions are 
violated. For example, a medical diagnosis system may 
confidently misdiagnose a patient who is actually 
suffering from a disease it does not know about. A 
threat assessment system will be deceived by electronic 
interference that puts "ghost targets" on the radar screen 
if the behavior of the interference device is not 
represented in its knowledge base. A navigation system 
may go awry if unforseen weather conditions impact the 
performance of its sensors. 
No modeler can hope to cover all possibilities that 
might arise. If the model is a good one, the situations 
it cannot handle should be rare. But it is important to 
be able to recognize such situations when they arise. 
Even when a system cannot revise its own model of the 
situation, it can alert the user that its model may be 
inadequate in the current situation. As research in 
dynamic model construction matures, model failure 
indicators will provide an important component of a 
control strategy for model construction and revision. It 
may be necessary or desirable not to explore some 
search paths during network construction, or to prune 
parts of the network when hypotheses become 
improbable or nearly independent of the hypotheses of 
interest. But an improbable hypothesis may become 
more probable as more evidence is observed. In such 
situations, a trigger is needed to alert the system that it 
may be necessary to explore search paths that were 
initially ignored, or to bring back pruned parts of the 
network. 
2 BACKGROUND 
A small world for an inference problem can be 
represented as a vector X of propositional variables. 
Each variable Xi can take on values in the set XiE { XiJ, 
... , Xiki I. Let & denote a subvector of X whose values 
have been observed; these are called the e vidence 
variables. Let Xt denote a subvector of target variables, 
or variables whose values have not been observed, but 
are of direct interest. Denote the remaining unobserved 
variables as Xu. Unobserved variables may become 
evidence variables if their values are observed at a future 
time, but at present their values are of interest only 
because of their relationship to the target variables. 
Assume the variables are ordered so that X = IXt. Xe. 
Xu I. The goal of inference is to draw conclusions about 
the values of the target variables X 1 given observed 
values & for the evidence variables. 
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A probabilistic model for the small world assigns a 
probability distribution over the variables in the small 
world. The a ssessed probability for an assignment of 
values to the variables is denoted by Pa(K). Inference 
within the model consists of conditioning the assessed 
probability distribution on the observed values for the 
evidence variables: 
pa�.Xu I�)= P
aw -- ,or 
pa�) 
Pa� I�) (I) 
A model is at best an approximation of what is being 
modeled. The distribution PaO is assessed relative to 
some assumed context; if the assumptions are violated, 
then the model no longer applies. If Pa(-) is a good 
approximation, one should feel confident that the 
assumptions underlying the model are at least 
approximately correct. Intuitively, the approximation 
is good if Pa(Xt I Xe) is nearly correct for most&· 
This intuitive notion of a good approximation is far 
from precise, and glosses over some important 
questions. What does it mean for P•(Kt I &) to be 
"nearly correct?" What should be the definition of 
"most & ?" I return to these questions later, when I 
formalize the idea of approximating a model. For now, 
an intuitive understanding of the quality of an 
approximation should suffice. 
Until recently, research on automated probabilistic 
inference has focused on computationally efficient 
methods for computing (1). Much less consideration 
has been given to the issue of deciding whether (I) is an 
adequate representation of the data generating process. 
The statistical community has devoted more attention to 
this issue, and there is a large literature on the theory of 
statistical hypothesis testing. However, the statistical 
hypothesis testing paradigm assumes an explicit, well 
formulated alternative model against which the current 
model is tested. In artificial intelligence applications, 
the purpose of model diagnosis is to initiate search for 
an alternative model. Requiring explicit representation 
and computation of the alternative model prior to model 
diagnosis defeats the purpose of the entire enterprise. 
Research on model diagnosis from an AI perspective is 
beginning to receive more attention. There is general 
agreement that suspicion should be aroused when a 
combination of evidence items occurs that was initially 
assessed to be highly improbable: that is, when Pa(Ke) 
= LOW .1 The problem with this idea is defining LOW. 
1 This recommendation appears to violate the likelihood principle, 
a central tenet of Bayesian theory. According to the likelihood 
When there are many uncertain evidence items, the 
probability of any one combination of values is bound 
to be quite small. Thus, the definition of a low­
probability evidence combination must be relative to 
the other evidence combinations that might have 
occurred. 
Habbema (1976) suggests identifying a set of 
"surprising" observations. An observation in the 
surprising set triggers extra diagnostic attention for the 
case in question. According to Habbema's definition, 
each observation identified as surprising must be less 
probable than all observations not considered surprising; 
and the total probability of  the set of surprising 
observations must be less than some threshold a. 
Laskey ( 1990) suggests comparing Pa(&) with the 
expected value E[PaCX.e)l of the probability of the 
evidence. These suggested approaches do provide 
measures of relative improbability, but they appear to 
be computationally intractable for the inference network 
models common in the literature on uncertainty in AI. 
Jensen et al. (1990) suggest a tractable indicator of 
conflict between items of evidence. Their conflict 
measure can be written: ( ?"(xe l) ... pa(xek) J c1 = Iog2 . Pa(xe l  •· .. ,Xek) (2) 
where the Xei are the observed values of the components 
of the evidence vector Xe = (Xe 1, ... , Xek). This 
measure is easy to compute using any of the currently 
popular evidence propagation algorithms. Both the 
numerator and denominator of (2) can be produced as a 
natural byproduct of evidence accumulation, if each node 
stores its original prior probability distribution Pa(Xi) 
along with its current conditional probability 
distribution p•(xi I&). The numerator of (2) is just 
the product of the prior probabilities of the observed 
values of the evidence variables. The denominator is 
also straightforward to compute as follows. Assume 
that evidence items Xe1· ... , Xek-1 have been observed, 
that P(Xe1 .... ,Xek-1) has been computed, and that the 
evidence absorption algorithm has resulted in the 
computation of a revised distribution for Xek· namely 
pa(Xek I XeJ, ... ,Xek-1). Now, when Xek is observed, 
the required joint probability can easily be computed: 
Pa(Xe1 , ... ,xek)=Pa(XekiXeJ , ... ,Xek-J)Pa(Xe1 , ... ,Xek-J). 
Jensen et al. justify CJ heuristically: they simply assert 
that one would expect the observed evidence to have 
higher probability than the product of the joi�t 
probabilities. Intuitively, if Xe1 has been observed, It 
might be reasonable to expect to observe values for Xez 
principle. the likelihood of data that might have been observed is 
irrelevant; all that matters is what was observed. But the 
likelihood principle applies to the agent's "true" model. The 
likelihood of unobserved data may indeed be relevant to the issue 
of whether the current approximation remains tenable. 
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Figure 1: CJ Positive With Probability .55 
P(x,y) P(x)P(y) 
Vl V? Y''l Yl n Y''\ 
� .1125 .H .H .3325 Xl .RH4 .1106 .1106 .3325 
X2 .1125 .H .H .3325 X2 .RU4 .1106 .1106 .3325 
X� .H .1125 .1125 .335 q .1122 .RU4 .u li4 .335 
.335 .3325 .3325 .335 .3325 .3325 
CJ given (x,y) 
Yl Y2 Y< 
XJ -.0413 .0073 .0073 
X2 -.0413 .0073 .0073 
X� .0289 -.0413 -.0413 
that are made more likely by the observation of XeJ, 
that is, values Xe2 for which 
P(x02 I x01) > P(x02) , or 
(3) 
But the example in Table 1 demonstrates that it is not 
necessarily ture that (3) is satisfied most of the time. In 
this example, there is a .55 chance that c1 is greater 
than zero, i.e., there is a better than even chance that the 
product of the marginal probabilities exceeds the joint 
probability. 
Although it may be probable that c1 is greater than 
zero, I will show in the next section that very large 
values of c1 are highly improbable. Furthermore, c1 is 
never positive in expected value. Its expectation is 
given by: 
E[c1l = -L F"'�)logz( a p•�� ) . (4) 
3, P (x01) 
.. ·P (x.k) 
This quantity is the negative of the information 
theoretic distance from .the probability distribution P"O 
to the distribution P'O, in which all the Xei are 
independent, but their marginal distributions are the 
same as their marginal distributions under Pa(-). That 
is, the expected value of c1 is a l)leasure of how closely 
the probability distribution P'O approximates the 
assessed distribution PaO. A well-known result from 
information theory states that ( 4) is never positive &nd 
is equal to zero only if the distributions P"O and P'O 
are identical (Kullback, 1959). In other words, the 
expected value of c 1 is more negative the greater the 
nonind.ependency among evidence items--that is, the less 
well P'O approximates Pa(-). 
When c1 is positive, the probability Pi(Xe) of & under 
the independence model is greater than the probability 
Pa(&) under the assessed distribution. In other words, a 
model in which the evidence items are independent fits 
the observed evidence better than does the assessed 
distribution. Now, the whole modeling exercise was 
based on the assumption that the Xei were related to Xt. 
and therefore to each other. That is, combinations of 
evidence items characteristic of a particular l>t should 
tend to occur together. When the independence model 
fits better than the assessed distribution, it is an 
indication that the particular combination & of observed 
values is characteristic of no l>t under the current model. 
The next section generalizes c1 to a family of "model 
suspicion" measures based on comparing how well pao fits the evidence relative to an alternative model. 
Unlike formal statistical hypothesis testing, the 
alternative model is generally not taken seriously as a 
candidate model for the data generating process. Rather, 
its purpose is to alert a system or user that the current 
model may be inadequate given the current situation. 
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
It is now time to develop a formal framework for model 
approximation and model failure diagnosis. Assume 
that the small world X is embedded within a larger 
world W = (X'.Y). The vector X' represents the same 
variables as X. but each may have additional outcomes 
in the larger world that are not represented in the small 
world. That is, XlE {XjJ, ... , Xik-o Xi(k-+1) . ... , Xir· }, 
f. l 
I I I 
where only the ust ki va ues are also possible values 
for X. The vector Y corresponds to variables that are 
not explicitly represented in the small world. Assume 
that there is some probability distribution PO on the 
larger world which PaO is intended to approximate. 
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Interpreting the distribution PO raises philosophical 
issues which lie beyond the scope of this paper, but a 
few words on how I interpret PO are appropriate. My 
main concern is with an automated reasoning system 
which computes belief values for the target variables Xe 
based on any evidence � that has been observed to date. 
Such systems are usually engineered by assessing 
probabilities from some expert or experts in the domain 
about which the system reasons. In this context, pliO 
represents a probability distribution assessed from the 
expert, who has restricted attention to the small world 
X. I assume that pa( ·) approximates some distribution 
PO over W,  in  the sense that PaO i s  obtained from 
PO by conditioning on the small world X. This does 
not necessarily mean that PO exactly represents the 
expert's beliefs over W, or even that the expert has well­
defined and coherent "true" probabilities over W. What 
I do assume is that if the expert were to make the effort 
to assess beliefs over the expanded world W, that this 
would result in the distribution P( · ), and that this 
distribution is a more accurate representation of the 
expert's beliefs than the assessed distribution pll(-). In 
other words, if computation and assessment burden were 
not an issue, and if a second system were built using 
the distribution PO, the expert would feel more 
satisfied with the output of the second system than with 
the output of the system based on the model PaO. It is 
also assumed that the expert thinks it is unlikely that 
the assumptions underlying the assessments are 
violated--that is, the expert thinks the small world is 
probable. 
A somewhat different interpretation is appropriate for 
systems designed for dynamic model revision. Here it 
is assumed that the full distribution PO was assessed 
from the expert, but is represented only implicitly in 
the system's knowledge base. The system has 
explicitly constructed just a small portion of this large 
implicit joint probability distribution. The 
assumptions underlying the model the system 
constructs amount to conditioning on the small world. 
Let the proposition q represent the assumptions 
underlying the assessed distribution. The proposition q 
includes the restriction of the values of X' to X. as well 
as some assumptions about the variables y:2 
q = (/\ Xje {xi!•···•xik})A(V Y=j:). (5) 
I 
):j 
P\·) was assessed under the assumption that q was the 
case. That is, for any x in the small world X: 
2This formulation might seem to preclude assumptions about the 
relationship between variables in X. (e.g., that X; and Xj are 
independent). However, one could [psot that X; and Xj are 
independent conditional on Y k• where Yk has high probability. 
Pa(x) = P(x 1 q) = L P(xs. I q) . (6) 
Y. 
If q is not the case, the model Pa(-) is not appropriate, 
and should be replaced by: 
P0(x) = P(x I -,q) = L P(xs_ I ...,q) . (7) 
Y. 
Neither the alternative model nor the probability P(q) is 
assessed explicitly. However, I assume that the context 
q is assumed because it is thought to be probable, i.e., 
P(q) = 1-e, where e is small. The model PO. restricted 
to the variables x·. can be written: 
(8) 
(where pa(X) is understood to be equal to zero if one of 
the Xi is outside the range of Xi). Because e is very 
small, Pa(A) provides a good approximation to the 
correct joint probability P(X). 
To summarize, I assume that the small world model 
pao over X is obtained by a combination of 
conditioning on assumptions thought to be probable 
(i.e., conditioning on q) and marginalizing on variables 
not of direct interest (i.e., summing over values of Y). 
The goal of inference is to estimate P(& IXe). Because 
the conditioning operator is nonlinear, there is no 
guarantee that the approximation error will remain 
small as evidence is absorbed. The relationship between 
the actual and estimated posterior probabilities given 
&=� can be seen from the following expression: 
P(� I x_) = 
(1-e)Pa�.x_) + eP0(�,x_) 
(1-e)Pa(x_) + eP0(x_) 
= (1-e*)Pa� I x_) + e*P0� I x_), (9) 
where 
e* = 
(1-e)Pa(x.) + eP0{x.) 
Comparing (8 )  and (9), it is clear that the "true" prior 
and posterior probabilities have the same form: both 
are weighted averages of the assessed model probability 
PaO and the unknown alternative model probability 
J><'O. The prior probability e of the assessed model is 
replaced in (9) by e*, the posterior probability of the 
assessed model given that the evidence variables Xe take 
on values�. 
Note that 
E* e 
--·--. 
(l-e) Pa�) (10) 1-E* 
Thus, the approximation error becomes large when 
P0(.1\e) is so much larger than Pa(.l\e) that it swamps the 
difference in magnitude between e and 1-e. The first 
term in (10) is called the prior odds ratio; the second 
term is called the likelihood ratio of the data given the 
two models being compared. 
It would seem straightforward, then, to decide when a 
model is no longer a good approximation to the 
observed data. Simply compare the probability of the 
observations under the approximate model to the 
probability under the alternative model, and i�i�i�te 
model revision when the ratio of these probabilities 
becomes too small. But a moment's thought reveals 
that this will not do: the reason for adopting the 
approximation in the first place was to avoid the 
expense of explicitly constructing a detailed model of 
the many improbable contexts in which P"O does not 
apply. In other words, you need to have already 
performed model revision in order to have pO(.l\e) 
available for computing (10). 
However, it may be possible to formulate "straw 
models," which capture some of the expert's intuitions 
about how the model could go wrong but are 
computationally much simpler than the fully s�cifi�d 
alternate model. The independence model descnbed m 
Section 2 is just such a model. The following theorem 
shows that a straw model is unlikely to fit much better 
than the assessed model in cases for which the assessed 
model applies. 
Theorem 1: Let p•o and P5(-) be probability 
distributions over X. Define the index of surprise at 
evidence Xe under p•o relative to pS(-) as: 
c5 = log{ :�� ] . (II) 
Let 1tK be the probability under p•o that cs is greater 
than K. Then 1tK < 2-K. 
Proof: 
� L 2K.pa�) = 2K1tK . 
p'�) K 
-->2 
p'� 
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-K Therefore, 1tK < 2 • 
A trivial consequence of Theorem 1 is that high values 
of conflict are a priori unlikely when the assessed model 
is considered probable. That is, any alternative model 
specified a priori is unlikely to fit the data much better 
than the assessed model. 3 
Corollary 1: If Xe is distributed according to P(k) = 
(1-e)P•(Xe) + eP0(&,), where pO(·) is a distribution not 
necessarily the same as P"O, then thg probability that 
cs is less thanK exceeds (1 - e)(1 - 2- ). 
The trick is to specify an alternate model that is likely 
to fit the data better than the assessed model when p•o 
does not apply. That is, we would like for cs to be 
large when e* is large (or at least in the most probable 
situations in which e* is large). To construct a model 
revision indicator, then, the modeler thinks carefully 
about situations in which the model might not apply, 
and about how the predictions of the model might fail 
when this happens. The modeler then formulates a 
straw model P50 which is computationally simple but 
captures some important features of situations in which 
the assessed model is likely to fail. 
Consider for example the conflict indicator c J. The 
evidence variables Xe are predictors of the target 
variables. They should therefore be expected to be 
marginally dependent--certain patterns of values of the 
Xe· are likely to occur together because they indicate a 
particular target vector �1; other combinations of values 
are unlikely because they are unlikely given any target 
vector. Without formulating an alternate model in 
detail, the modeler can still use situations in which the 
independence model fits the data better than the assessed 
model to diagnose possible problems with the assessed 
model. 
4 REBUTTALS 
A general theoretical framework for heuristic model 
revision indicators has been presented. In summary, the 
system is assumed to reason under a current model, 
which is regarded as an approximation to some more 
accurate model which may or may not be represented 
implicitly in the system's knowledge base. The 
approximate model is conditioned on an assumed 
context which the system regards as highly probable. If 
the assessed model is an accurate model of the 
phenomenon in question, it would be expected to fi� t�e 
data better than other candidate models. A heunstlc 
model revision indicator can be constructed by building 
3of course, one can always specify after the fact a model that 
predicted the observed data exactly. When there are many 
uncertain evidence items, the observed evidence will have a very 
low probability, and this "20-20 hindsight" model will fit much 
better than the assessed model. However, the a priori probability 
that exactly this model would fit the data was extremely low. 
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an alternate "straw model" which is not necessarily 
taken seriously as a model of the phenomenon in 
question, but which is likely to fit better than the 
assessed model in some class of situations which 
violate the assumed context. 
I have already considered one example of a "straw 
model" which gives rise to Jensen et al.'s conflict 
indicator c1. In this section, I relate another proposed 
model revision strategy (Laskey, 1990) to the 
framework proposed in Section 3. 
A Bayesian network for the probability model P80 is a 
directed acyclic graph in which each node corresponds to 
a variable Xi and the directed arcs encode direct 
conditional dependencies. Suppose that N is a Bayesian 
network for P80 and Xi!' ... , Xik is an ordering of the 
variables such that all preaecessors of Xi- in N are also 
predecessors in the ordering. Then Xi. i� independent of 
all preceding Xi given its immediate predecessors in 
N. The direct p�nts of the node X; are denoted by the 
vector Xp(i)· 
A probability model and associated Bayesian network on 
a set X of variables can be completely characterized by 
its node models. A node model for variable Xi is the 
tuple 
(12) 
consisting of the variable, its direct parents in N , and a 
set of conditional probability distributions for the node, 
one for each combination of values for its parent 
variables. 
In previous work (Laskey, 1990; see also Laskey, 
Cohen and Martin, 1989), I have suggested associating 
rebuttals with each node model.4 A rebuttal is a 
proposition expressing a condition under which the 
assessed probability distribution for the node model does 
not apply. Rebuttals make explicit the contextual 
assumptions underlying the model: in the terminology 
of Section 3, the truth of a rebuttal implies -.q. Thus, 
the system can monitor the rebuttal propositions and 
trigger model revision when a rebuttal is observed to be 
true. 
However, the system may not have the resources to 
check rebuttals routinely, or obtaining information 
about some rebuttals may be costly in time or other 
resources. Sometimes it might be desirable to associate 
a general "ceteris non paribus" rebuttal with a node 
model. That is, one allows for the possibility that the 
node model does not apply, but does not explicitly 
model the circumstances under which the assumptions 
are violated (unless the general rebuttal becomes 
sufficiently probable to warrant such effort). 
"The tenn rebuttal is due to Toulmin (e.g., Toulmin et a!., 1984); 
its use in this context is due to Matvin Cohen (cf., Cohen. Laskey 
and Ulvila, 1987). 
Let Rj be a variable taking on values RiE { ti.fil, where 
ti means that at least one of the rebuttals to 1'ti is true, 
and fi = -,ti means that all rebuttals are false. The 
assessed node model distribution assumes fj. That is, 
p8(Xi I Xp(i)) = P(Xi I XJilil,fi). To completely specify 
a model including the rebuttal variable Ri would mean 
specifying two additional distributions: the distribution 
of Xi given its parents and tj, and the distribution of tj. 
Additional compications may arise: ti might imply that 
Xi depends directly on other nodes in addition to Xp(i)· 
and Ri might depend on other nodes or other rebuttals 
(some condition may invalidate more than one node 
model). The network might become computationally 
intractable if these complexities were included explicitly 
(in fact, assuming them away may have been a 
computationally motivated approximation). 
It may be useful to specify a straw model which does 
not cover all these complexities, but might be expected 
to fit better than the assessed model when one of the 
rebuttals is true. Consider the following simplified 
model. First, a rebuttal is assumed to "break the link" 
between a node and its parents, so that: 
(13) 
That is, given tj, Xi is conditionally independent of all 
the nodes above it in N , and has the distribution 
P8(Xi I ti). Second, the rebuttals for different node 
models are assumed to be marginally independent of all 
other nodes in the network (i.e., Ri has no predecessors 
inN or among the other Rj). 
If the rebuttals are included explicitly in the inference 
network, the posterior probability P8(Ri I �) is 
computed as part of evidence propagation. If the general 
rebuttal Ri becomes probable, it may flag the system to 
build a more detailed model of the conditions under 
which the current node model for Xi is not valid. 
However, explicit representation of rebuttals doubles the 
number of nodes in the network.5 It is desirable to find 
a computationally simple method to determine when a 
rebuttal Ri has become probable. To determine the 
probability of Ri given evidence, one computes the 
posterior odds ratio by multiplying the likelihood ratio 
by the prior odds ratio: 
Ps(ti I x.,) 
Ps(fi I x.,) 
Ps(x., I t) Ps(t) 
---x--. 
Ps(x., I fi) Ps(fi) 
(14) 
When the likelihood ratio is large, the evidence Ke 
increases the posterior probability of ti relative to its 
prior probability. This likelihood ratio can be rewritten 
as: 
5No loops are added to the networl<, so algorithms to find loop 
cutsets or clique trees need work no harder. 
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p'� I�) 
P'� I fi) 
L P'� I xi�i)) P'(xi I ti) p'�(i)) 
(xi�J) 
• (15) 
L p'� I xi�(i)) !"'(xi I �(i)) p'�(i)) 
(xi�J) 
Note that the first and last tenns in the summands are 
the same in numerator and denominator, and that these 
tenns are independent of Ri. If Ri is the only rebuttal 
in the model, ( 15) can be reexpressed as: 
L p"� I xi�(i)) p'(xi I ti) p•�(i)) 
(xi�il) 
L p"� I xi�(i)) !"'(xi IJ>p(i)) p"�(i)) 
(X;�J) 
'""' P'(xi I �) £..J p"� I Xi�i)) p"(xi,Xp(i)) -. ---
(x;�) P (xi I �(i)) 
p•�) 
'""' P'(xi I ti) = £..J p"(Xj.l>p(i) IJ>e) ---
<x;�Jl !"
'(xi I xp(i)) 
(16) 
When there are rebuttals for other nodes as well, (16) is 
only approximate. It is a close approximation if the 
posterior probabilities of all rebuttals other than Ri are 
small. 
The sum (16) will be large when the evidence x.e makes 
probable values of (Xi-Xp(i)) for which the straw model 
probability pS(Xi I ti) is much larger than the assessed 
probability p"(xi IJ>p(i)). This might happen if Xi is a 
very atypical value of Xi given the values l>p(i) for the 
parent variables, but the evidence makes both Xi and 
l>p(i) very probable. 
Clique tree algorithms automatically keep track of the 
joint probabilities of the (Xi, l>p(ij): other algorithms 
can be modified to do so. However, computation of 
(16) generally amounts to about as much work as 
explicitly modeling Ri. Computation can be reduced by 
pre-selecting a subset of (Xi.l>p(i)) for which pS(Xi I ti) 
is much larger than p•(xi I Xp(i)). and monitoring the 
posterior probability for onfy the selected subset of 
values for Xi and its parents. 
5 RARE CASES 
I have suggested that model reviSion should be 
considered when low probability evidence is observed. 
But even if the model is correct, things which it assigns 
low probability are occasionally expected to happen. Is 
there any way to distinguish between rare cases for 
which the model is correct and cases not covered by the 
model? 
Sometimes the conflict can be explained by some rare 
hypothesis which is covered by the model. That is, 
there may be some variable Xk for which the value XkH 
would make the observed evidence x.e highly probable. 
The probability of the evidence can be written as: 
p•�) = p"(J>e I xk )p•(xk ) H H 
+ p"(J>e 1 x.k )p•( x.k ) . H H 
This can be very small even when Pa(l>e I XkH) is high 
if XkH was initially thought to be a very improbable 
value for Xk. If such a rare hypothesis could explain 
the conflict, the value of the conflict indicator cs will 
typically be decreased by independent evidence for XkH" 
That is, one finds an observable variable Xf for which 
the assessed probability of XfR is high given Xk = xkH but low given Xk * Xkw Observing Xf may resolve 
the issue. Precisely speaking, the value (x.e, XfH) was 
assessed to be much more probable relative to other 
values of (Xe, Xf) than was the value x.e relative to 
other values of X.,. Unless this is also true of the straw 
model, the conflict will be reduced upon observing l>fH· 
In any case, it is generally wise to single out for special 
attention cases which occur but were initially assessed 
to be highly improbable. It may be that, being rare, 
they were not thought deserving of as close modeling 
attention. Or it may have been that a heuristic model 
construction algorithm pruned parts of the network that 
were independent of the variables of interest given the 
falsity of the improbable hypotheses. These modeling 
decisions may need to be reexamined if the hypotheses 
become more probable than originally thought. 
6 DISCUSSION 
If probabilistic reasoning methods are to be used on 
problems where flexible network reconfiguration is 
necessary, indicators must be constructed that tell the 
system when its current model appears to be inadequate. 
Even for static models, it is important to alert users to 
situations which the system's model was not designed 
to handle. An exact decision theoretic calculation would 
require actually revising the model to decide whether 
model revision is necessary. This is clearly infeasible. 
This paper presented a class of theoretically justified 
heuristic model revision indicators. The idea is to 
construct a computationally simple alternate model 
which, although not a tenable model for the 
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phenomenon, is likely to fit the evidence better than the 
current model if the current model is incorrect. Model 
revision is initiated when the likelihood ratio of the 
evidence given the alternate model becomes 
unacceptably large. 
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